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COMMITMENT OF INDEPENDENT AND INSTITUTIONAL WOMEN 
DIRECTORS TO CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines how independent and institutional women directors on boards affect 
corporate social responsibility (hereafter CSR) reporting. Most of the previous empirical 
evidence has shown a linear association between female directors and CSR disclosure, but to 
the best of our knowledge, no research has investigated the individual effect of independent 
and institutional female directors on CSR reporting. Therefore, the analysis of how the 
disclosure of CSR information is affected by independent and institutional women directors in 
a separate way merits our attention. Thus, we posit that there is a non-linear association, 
concretely quadratic, between independent and institutional female directors on boards and 
CSR reporting. Our results demonstrate that, in line with the monitoring hypothesis, as the 
presence of independent and institutional women directors on boards increases, CSR 
disclosure improves, but when their presence on boards reaches a tipping point (20.47% and 
13.32%, respectively), CSR reporting decreases, which is consistent with the collusion 
hypothesis. This research contributes to existing literature on the relationship between board 
gender diversity and CSR disclosure by suggesting that board structures formed by 
institutional and independent female directors have an effect on CSR reporting. Hence, female 
directors play a relevant role on boards since they may influence CSR disclosure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to Gray et al. (1996), CSR reporting is “the process of communicating the social 
and environmental effects of organisations’ economic actions to particular interest groups 
within society and to society at large”. In other words, through CSR reporting, companies 
voluntarily disclose to stakeholders and society the environmental and social impacts caused 
by their daily activities (e.g., Hammann et al., 2009; Jamali & Neville, 2011; Jamali et al., 
2015; Vashchenko, 2017), going beyond the financial figures of interest to investors to 
describe firms’ relations with their stakeholders The disclosure of CSR information is not 
enforced by a specific law, but international bodies such as the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) make recommendations on CSR matters.  
Relevant decisions regarding CSR issues are approved by boards and, therefore, board 
composition is considered one of the most important tools for promoting CSR reporting 
(Muttakin et al., 2016). Samara et al. (2018) also support the significant role played by the 
board of directors in promoting CSR initiatives, specifically the environmental and social 
performance of family firms. The authors show that two governance structures of family 
businesses improve environmental and social performance: the combination of different levels 
of family involvement in the business with (1) outsiders on the board and (2) a high family 
presence on the board. Among the board attributes that may affect CSR disclosure, board 
gender diversity has received growing interest from scholars. Board gender diversity may 
imply a variety of opinions and ideas, which may affect CSR disclosure because a firm’s 
stakeholders are not a homogeneous group (Catalyst, 1995). Women empathise with 
stakeholders and show a higher sensitivity towards their demands and needs, thus 
demonstrating a greater concern for social and environmental matters. Taking these views 
into consideration and given that the female leadership style differs from that of males (e.g., 
Manzoor & Abrar, 2011; Alonso-Almedia et al., 2017), we expect that female and male 
directors will behave in different ways regarding CSR disclosure. 
Past research has examined the impact of independent (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015a) 
and institutional directors (Dimson et al., 2015) on CSR disclosure, but it has not 
differentiated between female and male directors. Researchers have also paid little attention to 
the effect of female directors’ typology on CSR reporting. As far as we know, a few authors, 
such as Cabeza-García et al. (2017), have attempted to analyse the effect of outside female 
directors and independent female directors on CSR disclosure, but no research has 
investigated the individual effect of independent and institutional women directors on CSR 
reporting. These female directors are not directly involved in the management activities of 
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companies, but there are some differences among them and, therefore, their incentives and 
engagement with CSR reporting may differ. Accordingly, the examination of how the 
reporting of CSR matters is affected by outside female directors (independent and 
institutional) in a separate way also merits our attention.  
Combining a non-linear association, women directors’ typology and CSR disclosure, we 
aim to explore whether there is a non-linear relationship between independent and 
institutional female directors and the reporting of CSR information. Hence, the paper 
addresses the following research question: How does the presence of female directors on the 
board affect CSR reporting? 
Our results show that as the proportions of independent and institutional female directors 
on boards grow, CSR reporting also increases, which is consistent with the monitoring 
hypothesis; however, with the inclusion of additional independent and institutional women 
directors beyond a tipping point (20.47% and 13.32%, respectively), CSR disclosure 
decreases, which is in line with the collusion hypothesis. Thus, our findings suggest a non-
linear association between outside women directors and CSR disclosure. This evidence 
confirms the importance of outside female directors (independent and institutional women 
directors) for CSR disclosure in Spain, where there are still high levels of ownership 
concentration, a lack of protection for minority shareholders and a lack of transparency in 
financial and non-financial information disclosure. Therefore, the most relevant innovation of 
this paper, in comparison to the preceding research that reports that independent female 
directors affect CSR disclosure either positive or negatively (a linear association), or that does 
not explore the effect of institutional female directors on CSR reporting, is that Spanish 
boards of listed firms made up by independent and institutional women directors will 
encourage or discourage CSR reporting depending on their representativeness on boards, 
which is consistent with a non-linear relationship.  
This study contributes to the growing CSR and gender diversity literature in several ways. 
Firstly, examining board structures with institutional and independent directors extends the 
knowledge of the types of female directors and their representativeness on boards that leads to 
better CSR reporting. Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to investigate the 
individual impact of both types of women directors on CSR disclosure in a non-linear way. 
Secondly, by analysing how diverse types of female directors on boards impact CSR 
reporting, we have tried to heed the call for exploring the effect of board gender diversity on 
CSR commitments in order to extend the scope of this analysis beyond the Anglo-Saxon 
context (Jain & Jamali, 2016). Thirdly, we contribute to the debate on how independent and 
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institutional female directors may impact CSR reporting, by combining two competing views 
(agency theory and social identity theory) and by reconciling past paradoxical findings 
regarding female involvement on boards and CSR disclosure. Prior literature has focused on 
different theoretical perspectives to analyse board gender diversity and CSR reporting, but it 
seems to have disregarded social and psychological aspects, which indicate that female and 
male directors behave differently when making business decisions. Finally, our evidence may 
alert listed non-financial firms’ shareholders, potential investors, policymakers, stakeholders 
and managers to the most appropriate gender representation on boards for encouraging CSR 
disclosure.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There are several competing views of the effect of women directors on CSR disclosure. 
Among them, the most common are the agency and resource dependency approaches. In this 
sense, agency theory postulates that the efficient supervisory role performed by female 
directors on boards will reduce information asymmetries, increasing CSR disclosure and, 
consequently, mitigating agency problems between managers and stakeholders (e.g., Reguera-
Alvarado et al., 2015). The resource dependence approach argues that female directors, given 
their capacity to maintain outside connections with stakeholders and organisations, will 
positively affect CSR disclosure because their presence on boards is a relevant tool for firms 
to gain legitimacy with stakeholders and society (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). Theories which 
explore board gender diversity and CSR disclosure from a social, behavioural and 
psychological perspective have been disregarded by some of the prior research, but they 
provide relevant theoretical arguments for examining such a relationship. Gender socialisation 
theory suggests that a female leadership style is more ethical and social than that of males and 
is thus more likely to be orientated towards stakeholders, therefore increasing CSR reporting 
(e.g., Landry et al., 2016). However, social identity theory posits that when the presence of 
women directors on boards goes from moderate to higher levels, they will be more likely to 
reduce CSR reporting because they will be classified as out-group members (boards with 
males and females) instead of in-group members (boards with a majority of males), 
performing better in-group than out-group (e.g., Nielsen & Huse, 2010). Our viewpoint, 
which is in line with Thomsen and Conyon (2012), is that most of these different perspectives 
are more complementary than contradictory. In this regard, from the agency, resource 
dependence and gender socialisation theories, a positive linear association can be predicted 
between board gender diversity and CSR disclosure, while a negative linear association can 
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be predicted from the social identity approach, and an inverted U-shape curvilinear 
association can be expected from an integration of agency theory, for instance, through the 
social identity approach (Ali et al., 2014). Thus, the positive or negative effect of female 
directors on CSR disclosure will depend, according to the theoretical integration employed, 
on the representativeness of female directors on boards (Ali et al., 2014; Richard et al., 2007).  
A relevant stream of empirical research supports the thesis that there is a positive or 
negative linear relationship between female directors and CSR reporting (e.g., Dobbin & 
Jung, 2011; Fernández-Feijoo et al., 2012, 2014a; Alonso-Almeida et al., 2017) or there is no 
significant association (e.g., Shukeri et al., 2012). This inconclusive evidence suggests that 
research should be based on contrasting approaches (a positive and negative linear 
association), which will propose a curvilinear relationship (Ali et al., 2014). To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no research focused on exploring a non-linear relationship that is 
concretely curvilinear between board gender diversity and CSR disclosure, which can be 
supported by the integration of agency theory with social identity theory. Thus, against such a 
backdrop, we wonder whether there is a non-linear association between women directors and 
CSR disclosure. 
Corporate governance codes and laws, particularly those in Spain, generally classify board 
directors’ typology between insiders and outsiders, who can be represented by women and 
men. According to the Spanish Unified Code of Corporate Governance (UCCG, 2006), which 
was updated by the Good Governance Code of Listed Companies (GGC, 2015), insiders are 
executive directors directly involved in a firm’s management, and outside directors can be 
split between independent and institutional directors, who have different agendas and 
incentives for controlling managers. Independent directors are professionals in a workplace 
totally outside the company and are interested in showing the responsible behaviour of firms. 
They do not have social relationships with firms or the families that run them, except in a 
professional capacity, and therefore they can perform their tasks without pressure from the 
firm, managers and dominant shareholders. Additionally, independent directors represent 
minority shareholders’ interests or dispersed ownership, protecting their rights with respect to 
the agency costs of controlling shareholders (Ferrarini & Filippelli, 2013). Independent 
directors are interested in protecting their reputation and credibility, which will depend on the 
extent to which companies are socially responsible and, accordingly, they will be more likely 
to disclose CSR information that signals to stakeholders their engagement with CSR matters. 
Institutional directors represent controlling shareholders and might have professional or 
personal relations with companies. Given the high ownership concentration of the Spanish 
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listed firms, dominant shareholders take important positions on boards, have a long-term 
horizon and have a strong influence on management (e.g., Pucheta-Martínez & López-
Zamora, 2017). The role performed by institutional investors who serve as directors on boards 
allows them to take part in the decision-making process of firms as shareholders and directors 
(e.g., Weinstein & Yafeh, 1998). These directors are considered strategic directors (e.g., Oh et 
al., 2011) since they may provide experience and guidance, connect firms with relevant 
stakeholders or significant external agents, obtain external resources and formulate strategic 
or other important decisions of firms (Shaukat et al., 2015). Thus, institutional directors are 
concerned with disclosing more company information in order to maintain the prestige and 
public image of a company, and therefore, they tend to demonstrate active behaviour towards 
CSR matters by integrating environmental, social and ethical issues into businesses (Wen, 
2009) in order to demonstrate commitment to stakeholders. Hence, they will try to satisfy 
stakeholders’ needs by encouraging the management team to report CSR issues.  
Based on agency theory, shareholders may demand external mechanisms such as voluntary 
CSR disclosure (Fernández-Feijoo et al., 2014a; Jo et al., 2016) in order to monitor managers’ 
functions and obtain greater transparency of financial or non-financial information. In this 
sense, the agency approach assigns the board the traditional role of representing shareholders 
and protecting them from managers (Griffin, 2017). In this regard, board composition has a 
relevant role in the decision-making process (Hassan et al., 2018) since it reduces agency 
costs and encourages CSR disclosure. Specifically, outside directors (independent and 
institutional) do not have a link with the company, so they tend to disclose more social and 
environmental information to society and other stakeholders because they are not usually 
aligned with managers. In addition to outsiders, agency theory also postulates that board 
gender diversity is a key attribute, as female directors on boards tend to be more transparent 
and accountable (Luoma & Goodstein, 1999). This renders women directors as a relevant 
corporate governance mechanism for controlling managers (Carter et al., 2003), since they 
will be more likely to mitigate agency problems (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), thus reducing 
information asymmetries through the disclosure of CSR issues. This approach also argues that 
board gender diversity may provide a greater variety of opinions, ideas, values, expertise, 
experience and backgrounds, as well as different perceptions and sensitivity to CSR matters. 
This might impact on the disclosure of CSR information since stakeholders linked with a 
company comprise a heterogeneous group (Catalyst, 1995). Given that stakeholders’ interests 
differ and are not always aimed in the same direction, as the presence of women directors 
increases on boards, they will become more heterogeneous, which will therefore make it 
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possible to better understand stakeholders’ needs (Ayuso & Argandoña, 2007). According to 
Eagly et al. (2003) and Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015b), women directors are 
characterised by their empathy, communication skills, participation and cooperation, which 
lead them to have greater concern for social and environmental matters, which may positively 
impact CSR reporting (e.g., Kesner, 1988). Thus, when female directors on boards rise from 
low to moderate levels, the benefits go on improving, in line with that suggested by Knouse 
and Dansby (1999), and female directors on boards might have a positive impact on CSR 
reporting (e.g., Fernández-Feijoo et al., 2014b; Liao et al., 2016) because they are considered 
to be more benevolent and less power-orientated than their male counterparts (Adams & 
Funk, 2012). 
Nevertheless, when the percentage of female directors increases from moderate to higher 
levels, they will categorise themselves and others, given that gender diversity is considered a 
demographic factor (Lau & Murnighan, 1998), as either in-group (board directors with the 
same demographic group: normally the majority, males) or out-group (board directors with a 
different demographic group: female and male directors) (e.g., Nielsen & Huse, 2010; 
Terjesen et al., 2009), which is consistent with social identity theory. Individuals who are 
considered part of the out-group find it more difficult to join with those who are in-group 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Individuals who are part of the in-group tend to interact and perform 
better than those who are in the out-group because they consider themselves as superior, 
trustworthy, honest and cooperative (McNamara et al., 2017; Nielsen & Huse, 2010), thus 
undermining the contributions of the out-group (Wire, 2010), because their (the in-group) 
behaviours towards the out-group will be negative. Traditionally, boards have been dominated 
by males, and therefore, as Nielsen and Huse (2010) indicate, “women are likely to be 
perceived as out-group members” because they are the minority on most boards, performing 
worse than if they were part of the in-group. Out-group members tend to stereotype and 
negatively assess the skills of their cohort, creating a bias that causes members to undervalue 
the contributions of minorities such as female directors (Mackie, 1987; Miller & Brewer, 
1996). The interaction between board members generates an intergroup dynamic, which 
impacts on the development and outcome of the group, depending on the effects that the 
heterogeneous relations may cause, such as coalitions, divergences, conflicts, cooperation, 
confrontation or polarisation, among others, as social identity theory suggests (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). Therefore, male directors who share seats on boards with women directors 
might demonstrate uncooperative behaviour, resulting in intergroup divergence or decreasing 
intergroup support, communication and collaboration (Pelled, 1996; Kravitz, 2003). These 
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negative attitudes reduce board effectiveness because intergroup interactions are 
unproductive, consequently leading to reduced CSR disclosure. Thus, as women directorship 
increases, male directors will have to share power with their female counterparts, who possess 
different abilities and social competences, which may cause divergent processes and 
dissatisfaction with the organisation. Consequently, this might lead to negative individual 
performances (e.g., reduced productivity or sales), resulting in adverse group repercussions 
that negatively affect company outcomes, such as CSR disclosure.  
Hence, drawing on the integration of the agency perspective with the social identity 
approach, as the presence of outside female directors (independent and institutional) 
increases, firms become more likely to disclose CSR information. However, beyond a certain 
inflection point, more independent and institutional women directors on boards will reduce 
the disclosure of CSR information. Thus, from low to moderate levels of gender diversity, it 
will be beneficial, but from moderate to high levels of gender diversity, it will be detrimental. 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
Independent female directors and CSR reporting 
The UCCG (2006) and the GGC (2015) claim that independent directors should not have 
any relationship with a company in such a way that might influence their opinions or 
functions. Independent directors are a key mechanism for monitoring and controlling firms’ 
managers and board effectiveness (Wang et al., 2015). For this reason, the inclusion of 
independent directors on boards can be considered a link between a company and its 
environment and can promote CSR reporting, thus improving a firm’s long-term success. 
Harjoto and Jo (2011) and Fernández-Gago et al. (2016) demonstrate that independent 
directors on boards can put pressure on firms in order to ensure congruence between 
organisational values and social activities, thus contributing to an increase of both CSR 
disclosure and market value. Additionally, independent directors will be willing to show their 
commitment to stakeholders through the reporting of CSR information because they are 
concerned about their image, legitimation and reputation. We extend these perspectives to 
independent female directors since the agency approach suggests that women directors may 
reduce agency costs by disclosing CSR information. Papers by Al-Shaer and Zaman (2016) 
and Hyun et al. (2016) show that independent female directors have a positive effect on CSR 
issues, showing a linear relationship between independent women directors and CSR 
reporting. This evidence suggests that as the presence of independent female directors 
increases, there is a higher likelihood of reporting CSR information.  
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However, according to social identity theory, the addition of independent female directors 
beyond a certain threshold may result in a decrease of reporting of CSR matters since they 
will be categorised as the out-group, performing worse than if they were classified as part of 
the in-group, suggesting a non-linear relationship between independent female directors and 
CSR reporting. In addition to this, Fligstein (1991) also suggests that the financial know-how 
of independent directors is one of the main reasons for appointing them. Moreover, 
independent directors do not maintain investment or business links with companies and their 
shareholders. Thus, these directors are better able to analyse financial issues than other 
information, such as CSR matters. Consequently, board independence may be negatively 
associated with CSR disclosure, as supported by Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015a). Garcia-
Sanchez et al. (2014) provide evidence that independent directors disagree with disclosing 
CSR information since this could affect their professional reputation, especially given that 
they are not experts in CSR matters, as Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Mohamad et al. (2011) 
also show. Thus, when the proportion of independent female directors on boards exceeds a 
certain threshold, it might be detrimental for addressing CSR matters, not only because they 
are categorised as the out-group, but also because independent female directors may be 
perceived by their male counterparts as not having the appropriate expertise related to CSR 
issues. As far as we know, no prior research has explored a non-linear association between 
independent women directors and CSR reporting. Therefore, we have attempted to fill this 
gap by integrating agency theory with social identity theory, and accordingly, we formulate 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: As the proportion of independent female directors on boards increases, CSR 
reporting is increased; however, beyond a tipping point, more independent women directors 
will have a negative impact on CSR reporting 
 
Institutional female directors and CSR reporting 
Institutional directors on boards represent dominant investors, such as institutional 
investors. According to agency theory, these investors become actively involved with 
management activities, leaving their passive roles regarding the supervision of managers 
(Ivanova, 2017). Additionally, institutional investors constitute one of the most important 
elements in the corporate decision-making process (Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 2011).  
With regard to CSR disclosure, institutional investors guarantee sustainable actions of 
firms in the longer term (Bolton et al., 2002) and enhance CSR reporting (Harjoto et al., 2015; 
Hwang et al., 2015), which help achieve long-term success and benefits for the company. 
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Dyck et al. (2015) find that institutional investors prefer to represent companies involved with 
CSR issues because one of their main priorities is to consider CSR responsibilities in the 
investment decisions of firms, instead of prioritising firms’ economic benefits. In addition, 
institutional investors tend to secure changes in CSR-related shareholder proposals (Del 
Guercio & Tran, 2012) and voting engagements on CSR issues (Dimson et al., 2015). 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) documented that voluntary CSR disclosure in companies tends to 
attract institutional investors, who play monitoring and governance roles and have long 
investment horizons. Authors such as Neubaum and Zahra (2006), Zattoni (2011) and 
Pucheta-Martínez and López-Zamora (2017) find that institutional directors encourage CSR 
reporting.  
However, the relation between institutional investors and CSR disclosure may be negative. 
Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) and Ghabayen et al. (2015) show that institutional 
shareholding has a significant and negative effect on CSR reporting, since institutional 
investors may engage in opportunistic behaviours in order to enjoy private benefits; they may 
work together with managers and, as a consequence, may reduce the monitoring functions in 
their governance. Furthermore, Chava (2014) reports that firms’ environmental issues are 
negatively affected by institutional ownership.  
Thus, according to this literature, we argue that effective control mechanisms on boards by 
institutional investors may have both positive and negative effects on CSR disclosure in a 
linear way. However, Feng and Song (2013) demonstrate a non-linear association, specifically 
a quadratic arrangement, between institutional investors and CSR disclosure, as a combined 
result of the monitoring and entrenchment hypotheses. Harjoto et al. (2015) also find a non-
linear association between institutional ownership and CSR disclosure, suggesting that active 
institutional investors exert a quadratic influence on CSR reporting. Thus, when institutional 
directorship is low, the monitoring hypothesis prevails, as it is positively associated with CSR 
reporting and, as a consequence, institutional directors perform an active role in encouraging 
managers and other directors to disclose CSR information. However, if the proportion of 
institutional directors on boards reaches a certain threshold, the entrenchment or collusion 
hypothesis prevails, and they are negatively associated with CSR disclosure, given that they 
prefer to achieve absolute control of firms, which may unfavourably impact CSR disclosure.  
We extend the above views to the role of institutional female directors on boards. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no prior evidence on how institutional women directors on 
boards affect CSR reporting. Drawing on the agency perspective, we expect a positive effect 
of institutional female directors on CSR reporting as their presence on boards increases, since 
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they will play a role in supervising and monitoring respective managers’ behaviour. However, 
institutional women directors will negatively affect the disclosure of CSR information when 
their representation exceeds a tipping point, according to social identity theory, given that 
they will be classified as an out-group, performing worse than if they were the in-group. 
Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: As the proportion of institutional female directors on boards increases, CSR 
reporting is increased; however, beyond a tipping point, more institutional women directors 
will negatively impact on CSR reporting 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
The sample is composed of 152 Spanish non-financial listed firms over the period 2004–
2014. Financial companies were excluded from the sample because they use unique 
accounting, which is difficult to compare with industrial companies, and because they are 
regulated by financial authorities using special norms. Thus, the final sample includes a panel 
data of 1,312 firm-year observations. As Arellano (2003) shows, our unbalanced panel data 
might report findings that are as consistent as those provided by balanced panel data.  
We built our database from the following sources. The CSR data was obtained from the 
GRI web page and from the corporate web pages of the companies. The GRI is considered a 
relevant instrument for providing important information concerning financial, environmental 
and social issues (Fernández-Feijoo et al., 2014a). Then, we collected the CSR information 
from two sources: the GRI web page and companies’ web pages. The financial data (ROA, 
LEV and SIZE) was collected from the “Sistemas de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos” (SABI) 
database, and the corporate governance data (INDEP_WOM, INST_WOM, INDEP, INST, 
OWNCON and BDSIZE) was obtained from the Public Register of the Spanish Securities 
Market Commission (CNMV), specifically from the corporate governance annual reports that 
Spanish listed companies are required to disclose. The annual corporate governance report 
allowed us to ascertain how directors (in our case, female directors) are considered 
independent versus institutional.  
 
Variables 
Our dependent variable is defined as CSR_INDEX and is measured as an average score 
derived from the ratio between the aggregation of the following five items of CSR – each one 
measured as a dummy variable – and the total five items analysed: (1) disclosure of CSR 
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information by any means – that is, this item will be given a value of 1 if a firm discloses 
information on social and environmental matters on its home page using its own reports 
and/or discloses this information using the GRI report, with 0 given when firms do not report 
CSR information in any case; (2) disclosure of CSR information through non-GRI reports – 
i.e., this item will be given a value of 1 if a firm does not disclose CSR information using the 
GRI reports (firms do not follow the pattern or format of report recommended by the GRI), 
but it does provide this information according to its own criterion and on its own home page 
with its own report, with 0 given otherwise; (3) disclosure of CSR information through the 
GRI reports – that is, this item will be given a value of 1 if a firm discloses social and 
environmental information using the format or pattern of report recommended by the GRI, but 
the companies may also provide this information by other means, with 0 given otherwise; (4) 
the CSR report is certified (checked) by the GRI – that is, this item will be given a value of 1 
if the GRI report used by a firm to disclose social and environmental information is checked 
by the GRI, with 0 given otherwise; and (5) the CSR information is also audited by an 
external and independent body (external assurance) – that is, this item will be given a value of 
1 if the CSR information disclosed by a firm is audited by an independent and external body, 
with 0 given otherwise. This measure has been created according to the method of analysis of 
CSR used by Alonso-Almeida et al. (2015), Dong et al. (2014), Harjoto et al. (2015) and Lock 
and Seele (2016), among others. In Table 1, we show the classification of firms, according to 
the values of the CSR index ranging from 0 to 1:  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
We have used the following independent variables. The proportion of independent women 
directors is defined as INDEP_WOM, and the proportion of institutional women directors is 
designated as INST_WOM. The quadratic terms of both variables are labelled as 
INDEP_WOM2 and INST_WOM2 and are calculated as the square of the proportion of 
institutional and independent women directors on boards, respectively. 
The following control variables have been employed. INDEP and INST represent the 
proportion of independent and institutional directors on boards (Harjoto et al., 2015), 
respectively. To analyse the effect of ownership concentration, we define OWNCON, which 
is measured as the proportion of shares held by shareholders holding at least 10% of a firm’s 
stock, and BDSIZE is measured as the total number of directors serving on boards (Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al., 2015a). Firm performance is denoted by ROA. Another control variable 
used is leverage, defined as LEV. Firm size (e.g., Rodríguez-Ariza et al., 2017), defined as 
SIZE, is also controlled for (Li & Chen, 2018). Finally, we have taken into account the 
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business sector, defined as SEC, which is calculated as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
company belongs to the sector analysed, with 0 otherwise. We have used the industry 
classification set up by the CNMV, described in Table 2, where we offer a summary of all the 
variables employed and the way in which they have been operationalised.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
Thus, we propose the following model: 
CSR_INDEXit = α + β1·INST_WOMit + β2·INST_WOMit2 + β3·INDEP_WOMit + 
β4·INDEP_WOMit2 + β5·INDEPit + β6·INSTit + β7·OWNCONit + β8·BDSIZEit + β9·ROAit + 
β10·LEVit + β11·SIZE it + β12 SEC (i)it + µit + εit 
where year and firm fixed effects are represented by µit and the error by εit. Firm fixed 
effects take into account regular and non-observable features of firms that may be associated 
with CSR reporting.  
The most suitable methodology for estimating this model is the Tobit regression for panel 
data, because it allows us to consider a dependent variable with limits on the left or right 
censoring. The dependent variable in our research, CSR_INDEX, ranges between 0 and 1, 
inclusive. Accordingly, this variable is censored on two sides (0–1), and therefore, the most 
appropriate regression for testing our hypotheses is a Tobit model.  
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
The descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and control variables are presented 
in Table 3. This table reports that the CSR disclosure of Spanish non-financial listed firms is, 
on average, 0.15 out of 1. This value shows that the level of CSR information disclosed by 
Spanish listed firms is moderate. According to board composition, we can observe that the 
proportions of independent and institutional directors represent, on average, 30.27% and 
44.70%, respectively, while the proportions of independent and institutional women directors 
on boards represent, on average, 3.18% and 4.55%, respectively. These results suggest that 
institutional directors and institutional women directors have more representation on boards 
than independent directors and independent female directors. The ownership concentration 
represents, on average, 43.67%, the board size is, on average, 10.20 members, and the firm 
size is, on average, 10.56 (log of the total sales, expressed in thousands of euros). Moreover, 
the return on assets is, on average, 2.56%, and the leverage of firms is, on average, 53.20%.  
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With regard to industries, on average, the “other” manufacturing industry is the highest 
represented sector, with 23.55%, and the least represented sector is agriculture and fisheries, 
with 1.60%.  
<Insert Table 3 here> 
For the sake of brevity, the correlation coefficients for all the variables used in this analysis 
in order to check for multicollinearity are not reported. The correlations in pairs of all the 
variables are not greater than 0.80 (Carcello & Neal, 2000). Therefore, based on these results, 
we can affirm that multicollinearity concerns do not arise.  
 
Regression results 
Table 4 presents the results of the Tobit regression. As you can see, we built two models 
and they are statistically significant. In Model 1, we analyse how independent women 
directors on boards affect CSR disclosure, while in Model 2, we investigate the relationship 
between institutional women directors on boards and CSR reporting.  
In Model 1, the variables denoting independent women directors on boards in a linear 
(INDEP_WOM) and non-linear way (INDEP_WOM2), which are concretely quadratic (non-
linear), present the expected signs and are statistically significant, as predicted. Thus, 
according to this result, the first hypothesis cannot be rejected as it appears that the presence 
of independent women directors on boards increases CSR disclosure. However, as the 
representation of independent female directors on boards exceeds a tipping point (20.47%), 
CSR reporting is negatively impacted. Some past research provides evidence that independent 
directors enhance CSR disclosure (Harjoto & Ho, 2011; Fernández-Gago et al., 2016), while 
authors such as Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2014) and Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015a) report 
that these directors have a negative effect on CSR reporting. Our results support the 
monitoring hypothesis, because increases in the proportion of independent women directors 
on boards up to a certain point may encourage CSR reporting. However, when the percentage 
of independent female directors exceeds this point, they might collude with managers and 
support their decisions, consistent with the collusion hypothesis, which may not be in line 
with promoting CSR disclosure. Consequently, it will be more likely that CSR reporting 
decreases.  
In Model 2, the variables of institutional women directors on boards present a linear 
(INST_WOM) and non-linear (INST_WOM2) relation, exhibiting the expected signs, and are 
statistically significant. Hence, our empirical findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2, which 
suggests that the disclosure of CSR information improves as the proportion of institutional 
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women directors on boards increases, but only up to a point (13.32%), beyond which further 
increases are associated with decreases in CSR disclosure. This idea is confirmed by Frink et 
al. (2003), who show that the optimal proportion of women directors on boards occurs when it 
is balanced. In line with institutional directors, authors such as Feng and Song (2013) and 
Harjoto et al. (2015) report a non-linear relationship between institutional ownership and CSR 
reporting, because they consider social activities as a priority in their investment decisions. In 
line with the findings obtained for independent female directors, our evidence also supports 
the monitoring and collusion hypotheses with institutional female directors. In this regard, as 
the presence of institutional female directors on boards increases, there is a higher probability 
that they positively influence CSR disclosure; but when their presence on boards reaches a 
turning point, this situation will invert (collusion hypothesis) and they may support executive 
teams’ decisions focused on other socio-economic decisions that do not consider CSR 
disclosure as a main strategy to increase firm performance.  
Regarding control variables, we can appreciate that independent directors (INDEP), 
ownership concentration (OWNCON), board size (BDSIZE), return on assets (ROA), 
leverage (LEV) and firm size (SIZE) present a positive sign and are statistically significant in 
the two models, with the exception of the proportion of independent directors, which is not 
statistically significant in Model 1. Additionally, the proportion of institutional directors on 
boards (INST) and the sector (SEC(i)) report a negative sign and are statistically significant in 
the two models.1 In Figure 1, we show a summary of our main findings.  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
We also control for the potential endogeneity concerns between independent female 
directors, institutional female directors and CSR reporting, given that these problems might 
appear in research such as this (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Specifically, we would like to 
assess whether the proportion of independent and institutional women directors on boards 
leads to more or less CSR disclosure, or whether companies with more or less CSR disclosure 
may be more or less attractive for independent and institutional women directors. The 
causality between CSR reporting and these female directors is probably in the direction from 
directors to CSR disclosure, but it is also possible that the disclosure of CSR matters might 
impact board structure. The causality issue has been addressed by lagging measures of the 
independent variables, which is consistent with Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Ozkan (2007), 
who support the use of lagged explanatory variables to reduce potential endogeneity 
problems. The findings, not provided for the sake of brevity, are in line with the results 
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obtained in the baseline model – that is, the estimates of the models with lagged explanatory 
variables confirm the earlier findings. Thus, the results suggest that the potential endogeneity 
is not a problem in our research.  
 
Sensitivity analysis 
To test the robustness of our findings, we ran the model using three different dependent 
variables: (1) the CSR_INDEX calculated as the aggregation of the five items of CSR 
considered, each one measured as a dummy variable; (2) the CSR_INDEX calculated as the 
ratio between each of six items – the five items considered in the dependent variable used in 
the baseline model plus an additional item – and the total six items (each item is computed as 
a dummy variable; the additional and sixth item takes into account whether the assurance 
scope refers to the entire CSR report; thus, this item will be given a value of 1 if the whole 
CSR report is verified, with 0 otherwise); and (3) the CSR_INDEX calculated as the 
aggregation of the six items of CSR considered in point (2), with each one measured as a 
dummy variable. The findings obtained, which are not reported for the sake of brevity, 
corroborate our predictions regarding the curvilinear relationship between independent and 
institutional female directors and CSR disclosure. Hence, our findings are robust, since they 
do not depend on the way that CSR reporting is measured in this research.  
 
DISCUSSION  
To explore how independent and institutional female directors on boards affect CSR 
reporting, while controlling for company characteristics, we conducted multivariate 
regression analyses. Consistent with our predictions, our results show a positive relationship 
between independent and institutional women directors on boards and the disclosure of CSR 
information, but when their presence on boards exceeds a certain threshold, the reporting of 
CSR issues decreases, suggesting a non-linear relationship. These findings are robust to 
various additional tests. Our evidence supports the view that the typology of women directors 
on boards (institutional and independent) becomes a driver or non-driver of CSR reporting, 
depending on their representation. It seems that institutional and independent female directors 
perform a supervisory role, monitoring managerial behaviour, when their presence on boards 
ranges from low proportions to a certain tipping point, in line with the monitoring hypothesis, 
as agency theory suggests. Thus, firms will remain sustainable if the presence of independent 
and institutional female directors on boards remains below a certain threshold, indicating that 
their engagement with CSR matters and their interest in mitigating agency problems due to 
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information asymmetries may be reduced if more CSR information is disclosed. On the other 
hand, the findings also suggest that the collusion hypothesis prevails, undermining the control 
of managerial behaviours, as the proportion of independent and institutional female directors 
exceeds the tipping point, negatively impacting CSR reporting, which is consistent with social 
identity theory; consequently, firms will be less committed to CSR matters, stakeholders and 
society. Two opposite effects on CSR disclosure can be exerted by independent and 
institutional female directors on boards, which cannot be supported by a linear relationship, 
but rather by a quadratic relationship. Such a relationship suggests that there is an inflection 
point that might alter the correlation of internal forces of boards, impacting on the conflict or 
cohesion of the board intergroup (between female and male directors) or on the capability of a 
board’s directors to have an effect (Ali et al., 2014). Among board directors, there is an 
intergroup dynamic that exposes the effects that heterogeneous members have on the group 
outcome, such as confrontation, cooperation, conflicts, alignment of interests and cohesion, 
among others. Our evidence also suggests that when the presence of institutional and 
independent female directors on boards goes from low levels to the turning point, the power is 
mostly concentrated with men directors, and there will be cooperation, alliances and 
communication intergroup. This positive interaction between women and men may explain 
the positive effect of institutional and independent female directors on the disclosure of CSR 
matters. However, when the presence of institutional and independent directors exceeds the 
inflection point, more independent and institutional women directors might lead to 
dissatisfaction among all directors, causing conflict and a lack of cooperation and support 
intergroup, in line with social identity theory. Therefore, intergroup interaction may have a 
negative effect on the reporting of CSR matters. In conclusion, our findings suggest that 
representation of institutional and independent female directors below the inflection point 
drives their efforts towards engaging in CSR issues to meet all stakeholders’ expectations. 
These female directors may play an active and effective monitoring role and will tend to align 
their representatives’ interests with those of other shareholders, trying to guarantee 
management involvement in CSR matters, avoiding negative and opportunistic disclosures 
and supporting those that benefit a broad range of stakeholders. However, the monitoring role 
played by institutional and independent female directors will be less effective and weaker 
when their presence on boards is higher than the critical point, since they will tend to enforce 
their own interests at the expense of other directors – specifically, male directors. Their aim 
will not be the enhancement of CSR disclosure, but rather obtaining private benefits and 
supervising male counterparts in order to hinder them from fulfilling their own aims. 
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Therefore, institutional and independent female directors will be likely to collude with 
managers, supporting their decisions, and will be less willing to challenge the managers with 
regards to CSR disclosure. Managers may provide benefits to those institutional and 
independent female directors who do not hinder their decisions, such as limiting the reporting 
of CSR issues. Hence, this research offers sound guidance on the inclusion of independent 
and institutional female directors on boards and its effect on CSR disclosure.  
 
IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
DIRECTIONS 
This paper has both theoretical and practical implications. Firstly, our analysis can have 
substantial value for regulatory bodies, because it allows them to observe the clear evidence 
that there is under-representation of women on boards, and this is in spite of the fact that the 
proportion of independent and institutional women on boards tends to improve CSR 
disclosure until their presence reaches a certain inflection point. This research is framed in a 
context where the gender quota on boards is a recommendation for firms, as opposed to the 
mandatory quota implemented in some countries such as, for instance, Norway. Thus, our 
evidence may be relevant for regulators who should introduce laws or recommendations to 
enhance gender quotas on corporate boards, because an optimal proportion of institutional and 
independent female directors on boards promotes CSR reporting. Policymakers should 
recommend the representation of institutional and independent female directors on boards 
until a certain inflection point, since they behave as a monitoring mechanism that enhances 
CSR disclosure and, as a consequence, information asymmetries may be mitigated. Beyond 
this tipping point, it is not recommendable to add more institutional and independent women 
directors, since their presence will discourage CSR disclosure. Secondly, our research is 
timely and might be relevant for Spanish practitioners, as the new recommendations and laws 
issued regarding the presence of female directors on boards are not being properly 
implemented. As CSR disclosure is considered a strategic decision, managers should also pay 
more attention to board composition, specifically to the presence of outside female directors 
(independent and institutional female directors), given the repercussions for the reporting of 
CSR matters. Thus, managers interested in improving their reputation, tenure, success and 
legitimation by society, as well as avoiding pressure from dominant stakeholders and 
handling risk not merely with investment and financial strategies, but also with CSR 
strategies, may wish to signal their engagement with CSR issues to stakeholders and society. 
Accordingly, managers might consider having more independent and institutional female 
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directors on boards until a certain threshold, as exceeding this inflection point will reduce 
CSR reporting. Companies should freely make up their boards, and in the case of institutional 
and independent women directors, they should consider suitable proportions to protect 
minority shareholders’ rights against dominant shareholders’ power, as well as playing an 
efficient supervisory role in enhancing CSR reporting. In the same way, stakeholders might 
also demand that firms improve gender diversity on boards, specifically increasing the 
proportions of independent and institutional female directors, since their presence on boards 
until a certain tipping point becomes an effective monitoring mechanism that promotes CSR 
disclosure. Finally, our findings may be useful for academics, since we consider CSR 
reporting as an essential duty of boards. In this regard, board directors have an impact on the 
decision-making process of firms and, therefore, will affect strategic decisions such as CSR 
disclosure. Researchers should explore more deeply what other kinds of female directors, as 
opposed to institutional and independent, affect CSR disclosure and how this effect occurs. 
Additionally, attributes other than the typology of women directors, such as their expertise, 
skills, backgrounds, ethics or sensitivity towards CSR matters, should be examined; this is 
despite the difficulty of measuring such characteristics.  
Several limitations of this research should be noted. Firstly, in this analysis, we do not 
consider affiliate directors as outsiders, which is in contrast to other research (e.g., Samara & 
Berbegal-Mirabent, 2017). Affiliates can be defined as directors who maintain or may 
maintain personal connections with companies and/or family owners. These include solicitors, 
financial advisors and experts, among others (e.g., Arosa et al., 2010), but they are not 
employees of the firm. The types of directors who made up Spanish listed firms’ boards, 
insiders or outsiders (independent or institutional), are provided in the annual corporate 
governance reports that these firms have had to disclose since 2003. The fact that Spanish 
laws and corporate governance codes do not consider affiliate directors may explain why 
annual corporate governance reports do not provide information on these directors. For this 
reason, in this research, we only focus on independent female and institutional female 
directors, although both types of women directors might also be affiliate directors. Secondly, 
our database was built using industrial companies, so our results cannot be used to interpret 
the results of financial companies. Thirdly, our CSR reporting measure may be considered 
simplistic since it provides little information on the content, quality and extent of the 
reporting. Ultimately, in this research, we only consider CSR disclosure towards external 
stakeholders, but internal social responsibility (towards employees), as Samara and Arenas 
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(2017) suggest, can be as meaningful as external social responsibility (towards the 
environment).  
Hence, we suggest the following future research avenues. Firstly, as Jamali et al. (2017) 
suggest, it would be interesting to analyse the role of informal firms and micro-firms in CSR, 
as well as the informal aspects of CSR activities in small to medium-sized enterprises, 
combining this topic with board gender diversity. Secondly, the development of a more 
thorough CSR reporting measure, increasing the content, quality and extent of the reporting, 
also merits the attention of researchers. Finally, we encourage scholars to explore CSR 
reporting towards internal stakeholders (employees), because internal social responsibility is 
as relevant as external social responsibility.  
 
NOTES 
1 We have estimated Models 1 and 2 using other control variables, but the two models used to test the hypotheses 
are the most significant.  
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Table 1 
CSR disclosure classification 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
 
Index Score Classification 
0 CSR information is not disclosed by firms 
0.1–0.5 CSR information disclosed by firms is moderate  
0.6–0.9 CSR information disclosed by firms is significant  
1 CSR information disclosed by firms is full 
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Table 2 
Variables description 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Variables Description 
CSR_INDEX The ratio between the aggregation of 5 items of CSR, measured each one as a dummy variable, and the total 
items considered (5)  
INDEP_WOM Proportion of independent female directors on board 
INST_WOM Proportion of institutional female directors on board 
INDEP The proportion of independent directors on boards 
INST The proportion of institutional directors on boards 
OWNCON The ownership concentration in the firm 
BDSIZE The number of directors on boards  
ROA Operate income before interests and taxes over total assets 
LEV Debt over total assets 
SIZE The log of total sales  
SEC1 Dummy variable: 1= Metalworking; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC2 Dummy variable: 1= Other manufacturing industries; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC3 Dummy variable: 1= New Technologies; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC4 Dummy variable: 1= Basic Metal; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC5 Dummy variable: 1= Mass media; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC6 Dummy variable: 1= Real Estate; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC7 Dummy variable: 1= Chemical industry; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC8 Dummy variable: 1= Financing and insurance; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC9 Dummy variable: 1= Energy and water; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC10 Dummy variable: 1= Construction; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC11 Dummy variable: 1= Commerce and other services; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC12 Dummy variable: 1= Cement, glass and construction material; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC13 Dummy variable: 1= Transport and communications; 0 = Otherwise  
SEC14 Dummy variable: 1= Agriculture and fisheries; 0 = Otherwise  
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Table 3 
Main Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Mean, standard deviation and percentiles. Panel A and B show the continuous and dummy variables, respectively. CSR_INDEX is measured 
as the ratio between the aggregation of the 5 items of CSR considered, measured each one as a dummy variable and the total items (5); 
INDEP_WOM is the proportion of independent female directors on board; INST_WOM is the proportion of institutional female directors on 
board.; INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on the boards; INST is the proportion of institutional directors on boards; 
OWNCON is the ownership concentration in the firm; BDSIZE is the number of directors on boards; ROA is the Operate income before 
interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is the debt over total assets; SIZE is the log of total sales; SEC1 1 if the company operates in 
metalworking sector and 0, otherwise; SEC2 1 if the company operates in other manufacturing industries sector and 0, otherwise; SEC3 1 if 
the company operates in new technologies sector and 0, otherwise; SEC4 1 if the company operates in basic metal sector and 0, otherwise; 
SEC5 1 if the company operates in mass media sector and 0, otherwise; SEC6 1 if the company operates in real estate sector and 0, 
otherwise; SEC7 1 if the company operates in chemical industry sector and 0, otherwise; SEC8 1 if the company operates in financing and 
insurance sector and 0, otherwise; SEC9 1 if the company operates in energy and water sector and 0, otherwise; SEC10 1 if the company 
operates in construction sector and 0, otherwise; SEC11 1 if the company operates in commerce and other services sector and 0, otherwise; 
SEC12 1 if the company operates in cement, glass and construction material sector and 0, otherwise; SEC13 1 if the company operates in 
transport and communications sector and 0, otherwise; SEC14 1 if the company operates in agriculture and fishing sector and 0, otherwise. 
Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel A. Continuous variables 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Perc. 25 Perc. 50 Perc. 75  
CSR_INDEX 1312 0.147 0.272 0.000 0.000 2.000  
INDEP_WOM 1312 3.176% 6.456 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%  
INST_WOM 1312 4.554% 7.993 0.000% 0.000% 8.333%  
INDEP 1312 30.271% 19.160 18.750% 30.000% 41.176%  
INST 1312 44.693% 24.014 25.833% 44.444% 62.500%  
OWNCON 1312 43.667% 27.641 19.009% 41.9112% 65.417%  
BDSIZE 1312 10.200 3.840 8.000 10.000 12.000  
ROA 1312 2.555% 18.595 -1.056% 2.616% 7.850%  
LEV 1312 53.191% 34.945 31.644% 52.915% 70.854%  
SIZE 1312 10.561 3.219 9.283 11.002 12.924  
 Panel B. Dummies variables 
     1  (1) % 
SEC1    109 8.308% 
SEC2    309 23.552% 
SEC3    99 7.546% 
SEC4    49 3.735% 
SEC5    43 3.277% 
SEC6    173 13.186% 
SEC7    34 2.591% 
SEC8    55 4.192% 
SEC9    123 9.375% 
SEC10    79 6.021% 
SEC11    122 9.299% 
SEC12    40 3.049% 
SEC13    56 4.268% 
SEC14    21 1.601% 
1 
Table 4 
Results of the Tobit regressions for independent and institutional women directors on boards 
 
 Expected sign 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INDEP_WOM + 2.551*** 0.000   
 
INDEP_WOM2 
 
- 
 
-6.231*** 
 
0.004 
  
 
INST_WOM 
 
+ 
   
1.235* 
 
0.056 
 
INST_WOM2 
 
 
 
   
-4.637* 
 
 
0.077 
 
INDEP + 
 
0.213 
 
0.132 
 
0.413*** 
 
0.002 
 
INST +/- 
 
-0.380*** 
 
0.000 
 
-0.406*** 
 
0.000 
 
OWNCON + 
 
0.260*** 
 
0.001 
 
0.263*** 
 
0.001 
 
BDSIZE + 
 
0.033*** 
 
0.001 
 
0.063*** 
 
0.000 
 
ROA + 
 
0.362** 
 
0.031 
 
0.393** 
 
0.023 
 
LEV + 
 
0.058 
 
0.393 
 
0.038 
 
0.583 
 
SIZE + 
 
0.033*** 
 
0.001 
 
0.037*** 
 
0.001 
 
SEC1 +/- 
 
-1.331*** 
 
0.000 
 
-1.395*** 
 
0.000 
 
SEC2 +/- 
 
-0.994*** 
 
0.000 
 
-1.395*** 
 
0.000 
 
SEC3 +/- 
 
-1.517*** 
 
0.000 
 
-1.007*** 
 
0.000 
 
SEC4 +/- 
 
-1.093*** 
 
0.000 
 
-1.121*** 
 
0.000 
 
SEC5 +/- 
 
-1.531*** 
 
0.000 
 
-1.566*** 
 
0.000 
 
SEC6 +/- 
 
-1.219*** 
 
0.000 
 
-1.325*** 
 
0.000 
 
SEC7 +/- 
 
-1.610*** 
 
0.000 
 
-1.660*** 
 
0.000 
 
SEC8 +/- 
 
-0.933*** 
 
0.000 
 
-0.971*** 
 
0.000 
 
SEC9 +/- 
 
-0.761*** 
 
0.000 
 
-0.821*** 
 
0.000 
 
SEC10 +/- 
 
-1.305*** 
 
0.000 
 
-1.315*** 
 
0.000 
 
SEC11 +/- 
 
-1.376*** 
 
0.000 
 
-1.385*** 
 
0.000 
 
SEC12 +/- 
 
-0.993*** 
 
0.000 
 
-1.049*** 
 
0.000 
 
SEC13 +/- 
 
-1.684*** 
 
0.000 
 
-1.758*** 
 
0.000 
 
Observations  
1312 
43.43% 
1312 
42.88% R2   
CSR_INDEX is measured as the ratio between the aggregation of the 5 items of CSR considered, measured each one as a dummy variable 
and the total items (5); INDEP_WOM is the proportion of independent female directors on board; INST_WOM is the proportion of 
institutional female directors on board.; INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on the boards; INST is the proportion of 
institutional directors on boards; OWNCON is the ownership concentration in the firm; BDSIZE is the number of directors on boards; ROA 
is the Operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is the debt over total assets; SIZE is the log of total sales; SEC1 1 if 
2 
the company operates in metalworking sector and 0, otherwise; SEC2 1 if the company operates in other manufacturing industries sector and 
0, otherwise; SEC3 1 if the company operates in new technologies sector and 0, otherwise; SEC4 1 if the company operates in basic metal 
sector and 0, otherwise; SEC5 1 if the company operates in mass media sector and 0, otherwise; SEC6 1 if the company operates in real 
estate sector and 0, otherwise; SEC7 1 if the company operates in chemical industry sector and 0, otherwise; SEC8 1 if the company operates 
in financing and insurance sector and 0, otherwise; SEC9 1 if the company operates in energy and water sector and 0, otherwise; SEC10 1 if 
the company operates in construction sector and 0, otherwise; SEC11 1 if the company operates in commerce and other services sector and 0, 
otherwise; SEC12 1 if the company operates in cement, glass and construction material sector and 0, otherwise; SEC13 1 if the company 
operates in transport and communications sector and 0, otherwise; SEC14 1 if the company operates in agriculture and fishing sector and 0, 
otherwise. Levels of significance: ***p<0,01; **p<0,05; *p<0,10. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Summary of the main findings 
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